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Cuomo: Abstracts of Recent Cases

ABSTRACTS
Constitutional Law-Discrimination in Interstate Commerce
The defendant was a resident of West Virginia. She went to
Maryland and purchased an automobile. The full purchase price
was 5,535 dollars, but the defendant traded to the seller an automobile for which she was given an allowance of 3,835 dollars,
leaving a balance of 1,700 dollars. She paid a tax to the department
of motor vehicles in the sum of 166 dollars, representing three per
cent on the full purchase price, for the privilege of effecting a
certification of title in West Virginia, pursuant to the West Virginia
statutory requirements. The statute provided for a reduction in
taxes on motor vehicles purchased within the state by reducing the
basis for taxation by the amount of the motor vehicle for which
it was traded. W. VA. CODE ch. 17A, art. 3, § 4 (Michie 1961). Held,
this part of the statute was discriminatory and violative of the commerce clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. Nuckols v.
Athey, 138 S.E.2d 344 (W. Va. 1964).
The commerce clause has been construed to prohibit a state from
discriminating against persons engaged in interstate commerce.
Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). This is
true even though the discrimination occurs after the property which
has originated in another state has become commingled with other
property within the state. Park McLain Co. v. Hoey, 19 F. Supp.
990 (E.D. N.C. 1937). In the Park McLain Co. case, a North Carolina statute required a 1,000 dollar bond and a ten dollar fee for the
sale of used automobiles purchased outside North Carolina and
brought into that state. No such requirement was made as to the
sale of other used automobiles. The statute was held unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce because of its discrimination in not placing like requirements on automobiles purchased within the state.
Discrimination in interstate commerce may also occur when a
state attempts to protect itself against economic competition. In
Polar Ice Cream Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964), the Court
held that neither the power to tax nor the police power of a state
may be used to establish an economic barrier against competition
with the products of labor of another state or its residents. The
same principle was applied in Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton,262 U.S.
506 (1922). In this latter case, a tax was placed upon merchandise
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purchased solely because of its origin outside the taxing state. The
Court struck down the tax as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
Where out-of-state commercial discrimination occurs upon business privileges as opposed to individual sales, the courts are consistent in striking down discriminatory statutes. In Westcott &
Cunning, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health, 195 N.E.2d 74
(Mass. 1964), a statute requiring an out-of-state manufacturer to
pay an annual license fee of twenty-five dollars for each place of
business he owned that manufactured harmful drugs shipped into
Massachusetts. In-state manufacturers were subjected to a single
annual license fee only. The court held the statute to be an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce because of its being
unreasonable and discriminatory.
Federal control over commerce prevails when goods and services
are in interstate commerce or affect interstate commerce. In this
area of national exertion, the federal power is supreme and
plenary. In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
442-444 (1960), the Court summarized the policy of the government on interstate commerce by stating, "In determining whether
the state has imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce, it
must be borne in mind that the Constitution when 'conferring upon
Congress the regulation of commerce ... never intended to cut the
States off from legislating on all subjects relating to health, life, and
safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect
the commerce of the country. Legislation, in a great variety of ways,
may affect commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting
a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution.'... But a
state may not impose a burden which materially affects interstate
commerce in an area where uniformity of regulation is necessary."
Internal Revenue-Deduction of Items Related to Capital
Transactions
S, a stockholder, owned stock in X, a company which was engaged in producing motion pictures. X contracted with Y for the
latter to distribute and exhibit three pictures which X was to produce. X was to receive a specified portion of Y's profits from
distribution and exhibition. X dissolved during a dispute with Y
over the amount of profits X was to receive from Y. S was given his
share of assets plus a claim against Y. S sought to deduct his legal
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costs as expenses incurred in perfecting his claim against Y. Held,

S was allowed to deduct his share of the legal expenses in addition
to related fees as ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in the
collection of income, although the amount received was taxable as
long-term capital gain. Commissioner v. Doering, 335 F.2d 738
(2d Cir. 1964).
What the court appears to have done in the principal case is to
allow retention of the nature of the expenses from the dissolved
company to the shareholder, but to give separate consideration
to the capital gains. The court considers the issue as being one of
two transactions - the exchange of the taxpayer's stock for a claim
and the collection of that claim. The authority cited by the majority
is Naylor v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1953), which
held that legal fees incurred in collecting the amount claimed to
be due under a contract of sale qualified for deduction were ordinary expenses even though the sale was of a capital asset. This
decision was questioned in Spangler v. Commissioner,323 F.2d. 913,
919-20 (9th Cir. 1963), where the court distinguished legal fees
incurred in determining the right to ownership of a claim and legal
fees incurred in determining the price to be paid for property. In the
former case, the court said the legal fees should be capitalized,
but in the latter case they should be treated as ordinary expenses.
The controversy stems from the meaning of expenses incurred for
the collection of income under § 212(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. Where an item which ordinarily is deductible as an
expense is paid in connection with a transaction involving the purchase or sale of an asset, the courts seem uncertain as to the proper
treatment. Thus, Hirshon v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 135 (Ct.
Cl. 1953), permitted a trader in securities to deduct federal stamp
taxes paid on the sale of stock instead of adding them to the cost
of the stock on the ground that the taxes were an ordinary and
necessary business expense. The Internal Revenue Service does not
seem to follow this view. In Maytag v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 270
(1959), stamp taxes were required to be offset against the selling
price rather than as a deduction as an ordinary business expense.
The court did recognize, however, that the commissions paid had
to be capitalized. Megibow v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.

1955), refused to permit a taxpayer who used the standard deduction to capitalize current taxes and mortgage interest on his
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residence so as to increase its basis when sold as a profit. Another
case similar to the Hirshon case is United States v. Pate, 254 F.2d
480 (10th Cir. 1958), which permitted a taxpayer to deduct as an
expense legal fees incurred in a suit to recover damages on the
destruction of a building, which damage would under the circumstances be treated as a capital gain. The Commissioner had urged
capitalization of the legal fees as a cost in obtaining the damages.
In Munson v. McGinnis, 283 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1960), a sale of stock
and assets to a creditor of a company in receivership was found
to have resulted from fraud. The matter was reopened. The stockholders were granted an additional sum for their stock, and legal fees
for services rendered in reopening the matter were treated as
capital expenditures.
The majority opinion in the instant case relies upon Campagna v.
United States, 290 F.2d 682, 684 (2d Cir. 1961), which held that
property distributed in liquidation having no ascertainable value
was to be taxable as capital gains since the transaction was considered open for tax purposes. However, in a similar situation,
Isaac G. Johnson & Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.
1945), litigation concerned only the determination of the fair market
value of compensation required in a condemnation proceeding and
the court held the expenses to be capital expenditures and not
deductible as business expenses for tax purposes.
Although the Commissioner seems firm in his position that
expenses should be capitalized where capital gains treatment
is given to income, the courts do not appear to be in agreement.
Perhaps the question should be resolved according to whatever
method clearly reflects income. Thus, if an attorney represents his
client in the acquisition of a capital asset, his fee will be capitalized
for tax purposes as part of the cost of the property; however, if the
matter is personal and not related to the earning of income, the fee
cannot be used either as a current deduction or an adjustment
to basis. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 262, 263(1), 106(a)(1).
Capitalization of attorney's fees incurred in property transactions
could properly be allocated to the years in which their value
extends. But, all other large legal expenses which are not deductible
under sections 162 or 212 should be currently deductible through a
formula similar to that provided for medical expenses. 74 Haiv. L.
REv. 1409 (1961).
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Wills--Weight of the Evidence in Proving Undue Influence

T,a testator, bequeathed property to D. F, T's heir, brought an
action to impeach the will on the ground that the bequest was not
made as a reponsible act of the testator. Held, the burden of proving
undue influence is upon the party who alleges it, and mere suspicion, conjecture, possibility or guess that undue influence has been
exercised is not sufficient to support a verdict impeaching the
will. Frye v. Norton, 135 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1964).
The court in the principal case, at page 611, held that "[W]hile
undue influence may be proved by circumstantial evidence, such
finding must be consistent with the exercise of undue influence
and inconsistent with any theory other than undue influence." This
holding does not indicate that West Virginia has changed the
weight of evidence required where fraud or undue influence is to
be proved. In light of prior case law and the context of the instant
case, it appears that West Virginia adheres to the requirement of
clear and convincing evidence in sustaining the burden of proof to
impeach a will because of undue influence on the testator.
In Thornton v. Thornton, 141 Va. 232, 126 S.E. 69 (1925), the
court ruled that an attack upon the validity of a will on the ground
of undue influence, to be successful, must be sustained by proof
that is clear, cogent, and convincing. The West Virginia Supreme
Court has held that fraud must be proved clearly and distinctly by
either direct or circumstantial evidence. LaFollette v. Croft, 122
W. Va. 727, 14 S.E.2d 917 (1940).
Clear and convincing proof is a commonly applied requirement in
weighing evidence in cases of undue influence. 9 WicMorx,
EvmNcE § 2498 (1940). In Ritz v. Kingdon, 139 W. Va. 189, 79
S.E.2d 123 (1953), the court held that in a trial by jury on the
responsibility of a testators act, a verdict which is without evidence
to support it or is against the clear preponderance of conflicting
evidence will be set aside.
In light of the total context in which the phrase "inconsistent with
any theory other than undue influence" was made, it does not appear that circumstantial evidence beyond that which is clear and
convincing is required in cases to impeach a will. The court clearly
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states that, although proof may be based upon circumstantial
evidence, such proof must amount to more than mere suspicion or
possibility that undue influence has been exercised, the court's
decision appears to be consistent with prior West Virginia cases.
Frank Cuomo, Jr.
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